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Abstract
The place of an anthropic argument in the discrimination between
various cosmological models is to be reconsidered following the classic
criticisms of Paul C. W. Davies and Frank J. Tipler. Different versions
of the anthropic argument against cosmologies involving an infinite
series of past events are analyzed and applied to several instructive
instances. This is not only of historical significance but presents an
important topic for the future of cosmological research if some of the
contemporary inflationary models, particularly Linde’s chaotic infla-
tion, turn out to be correct. Cognitive importance of the anthropic
principle(s) to the issue of extraterrestrial intelligent observers is re-
considered in this light and several related problems facing cosmolo-
gies with past temporal infinities are also clearly defined. This issue is
not only a clear example of the epistemological significance of the an-
thropic principle, but also has consequences for such diverse topics as
SETI studies, epistemological status of cosmological concepts, theory
of observation selection effects, and history of astronomy.
Keywords: history and philosophy of astronomy, cosmology: theory
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How many kingdoms know us not!
Blaise Pascal, ”Thoughts” (207)
1 Introduction
The simplest division of all cosmologies is into two broad classes: those pos-
tulating the eternal universe and those which postulate some origin of the
universe, or at least the part of it that cosmologists are currently inhabiting.
Eternal universes (and here by eternal I mean those with no beginning or
end, or even only those with no beginning) are the only ones which could
pretend to adopt some sort of stationarity, a condition which is of singular
importance in many branches of physics (among other issues because the law
of energy conservation is closely connected with a translational symmetry
of time), and which is certainly seen as greatly simplifying the solution of
specific problems everywhere. For a long period of time, after the dogma
of Creation in 4004 BC was abandoned, the universe has been considered
eternal, although great minds, such as Newton’s, began to perceive some of
the difficulties associated with such a proposition (e.g. North 1965). The re-
sistance to the opposing view (which eventually became what is today called
the standard cosmology) was established during most of the nineteenth and
early twentieth century and is epitomized in the words of one of the pioneers
of modern astrophysics, Sir Arthur Eddington, who in his authoritative Gif-
ford lectures for 1927, published under the title The Nature of the Physical
World, flatly stated: ”As a scientist, I simply do not believe that the uni-
verse began with a bang.”1 From the end of the Middle Ages until the Hubble
observational revolution in the third decade of the twentieth century, the sta-
tionary worldview has been in one way or another the dominant one among
the educated classes. This explains, among other issues, the dramatic re-
action of most of the scientific community, including Lord Kelvin, Holmes,
Eddington, Crookes, Jeans and others, to the discoveries of Clausius, Boltz-
mann and others, which all imply a unidirectional flow of time and physical
change. Interestingly enough, even during this epoch the idea, today one
of most investigated issues in physics, that the thermodynamical arrow of
time originates in cosmology, has occasionally surfaced (Price 1996; C´irkovic´
2003a, and references therein).
1Eddington (1928), p. 85. These words of Eddington preceded for more than two
decades the coining of the expression “Big Bang”, so they should not be interpreted as a
critique of a particular model (after all, the first model which could, in a loose sense, be
called a Big Bang model, was constructed by Lemaˆıtre only in 1931), but as rejection of
the general concept of originating of the world in a finite moment of time.
2
The power of a stationary alternative to the evolutionary models of the
universe has been reiterated in particularly colorful form during the great
cosmological controversy in late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s (Kragh 1996).
Although during this period of conflict between the Big Bang and the classical
steady state theories numerous and very heterogeneous arguments appeared
on both sides of the controversy, the argument based on the anthropic prin-
ciple was only explicitly formulated a decade after the disagreements ended.
As is well known, of course, the debate ceased when empirical arguments
persuaded by far the largest part of the cosmological community that a uni-
verse of finite age is the only acceptable theoretical concept. However, the
argument based on the anthropic principle has been further developed during
the 1980s and has gained relevance in a new and developing field of quan-
tum cosmology (together with other aspects of anthropic reasoning). The
present paper is dedicated to detailed consideration of the content and range
of applications of that argument. In spite of the huge volume of writings
on the philosophical aspects of stationary cosmologies (e.g. Hawkins 1971;
Gru¨nbaum 1991; Balashov 1994; Kragh 1996), this particular argument has
not been discussed in detail so far.
In modern physical cosmology, the position is reversed compared to the
situation in first decades of the XX century. The evolving universe with
definite beginning enjoys almost universal support, at least in the last three
decades (for a comprehensive reviews of the field, see Weinberg 1972; Harri-
son 1973; Peebles 1993). Prior to the discovery of the cosmic microwave back-
ground (henceforth CMB) in 1965, at least one of the stationary theories—
the classical steady state model of Bondi and Gold (1948), as well as Hoyle
(1948)—has been a viable and quite popular worldview. After the interpre-
tation of CMB as the remnant of the primordial fireball (Dicke et al. 1965)
has become a standard one (Sunyaev and Zeldovich 1980), the evolutionary
paradigm became universally dominant.
However, this is not the end of the story. There are at least two reasons
(apart from appreciable historical interest) to study arguments pertaining
to the cosmologies with infinite past even after 1965, both dealing with the
boundary conditions, but with significantly different slant.
• Great pains have been taken to make the initial singularity palatable or
to avoid it whatsoever (e.g. Misner 1969; Bekenstein and Meisels 1980;
Israelit and Rosen 1989), and the results are still inconclusive from the
point of view of most researchers, in spite of the tremendous advances
of the new discipline of quantum cosmology. The issue of a compulsory
nature to the initial singularity in the classical context has remained a
problem ever since the famous singularity theorems (e.g. Hawking and
Penrose 1970). This has been aggravated in view of the very special na-
ture of such a singularity entropy-wise (Penrose 1979; C´irkovic´ 2003a).
The significance of such a discourse is emphasized by recent attempts
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to build an atemporal worldview (Price 1996), in which cosmological
boundary conditions play the crucial role. It is particularly interesting
to consider in this context counterfactual cosmological models (such as
the classical steady state), and to compare their temporal aspects and
their boundary conditions with the realistic ones.2
• Recently, various ”multiverse” schemes have been proposed (e.g. Linde
1990; Smolin 1992), in which our visible universe is only part of a larger
structure (for a partial list of such theories, see Bostrom 2002). Moti-
vations for this sweeping generalization have been multi-fold, ranging
from details of the inflationary theory to topology to the fundaments
of quantum mechanics. Some of the proposed multiverses are indeed in
a stationary state, even somewhat resembling of the classical steady-
state theory. If these, still rather novel, propositions are to be taken
seriously, their impact on several distinct cosmological concerns have to
be investigated. One of the problems pertaining to the question ”one or
many universes” is that of the validity of various anthropic arguments,
among them the argument against an infinite series of past events as
discussed here.
The modern version of the anthropic argument against the past infinite
series of events (or past temporal infinity in relationist terms; see the discus-
sion below) has appeared in a short notice by Paul C. W. Davies appearing
in Nature in June 1978 (Davies 1978). In this succinct critique of the Ellis
et al. (1978) static cosmological model he points out that
there is also the curious problem of why, if the Universe is
infinitely old and life is concentrated in our particular corner of
the cosmos, it is not inhabited by technological communities of
unlimited age.
As mentioned by Barrow and Tipler (1986) in their encyclopaedic mono-
graph, this is historically the first instance in which an anthropic argument
has been used against a cosmology containing a past temporal infinity, and
it is indeed fascinating that nobody had considered it before. The suprise is
strengthened by the fact that such cosmologies in scientific or half-scientific
form have existed since the very dawn of science. Simultaneously, since an-
cient times a belief in the existence of other inhabited worlds has been
present, in one form or another.3 Today, the scepticism sometimes encoun-
tered against this mode of thinking is even stranger, when various (and in
2For instance, if the thermodynamical arrow of time depends on the cosmological
boundary conditions, as suggested several times since Boltzmann, the notion of time in
the everyday world ultimately depends on the low-entropy nature of the initial Big Bang
singularity. However, are we to discard the existence of an arrow of time in a steady state
universe in which there is no initial singularity and no net increase in entropy?
3For a historical sketch from the pen of a “contact pessimist” see Tipler (1981).
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some cases not quite inexpensive) SETI projects testify to the reasonable
degree of belief in the existence of technological civilizations other than the
human one. Their technological nature (the same one which produces the
problem Davies wrote about) is a conditio sine qua non of any sensible SETI
enterprise.
In tight connection with this issue is the definition of anthropic princi-
ples. Although we shall later discuss some other anthropic principles, for
the moment it is enough to define the weak anthropic principle (henceforth
WAP), which states (Carter 1974) that
...we must be prepared to take account of the fact that our lo-
cation in the universe is necessarily privileged to the extent of
being compatible with our existence as observers.
An alternative definition is given by Barrow and Tipler (1986):
The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities...
take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites
where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that
the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.
With these formulations of WAP in mind, it is clear why the Davies’ argu-
ment against the Ellis et al. cosmological model can be called anthropic at
all: it takes into account the restrictions to be imposed on cosmological mod-
els following the existence of a specialized subclass of intelligent observers,
namely the “technological communities”.
An ancient echo of this type of argumentation can be recognized in the
surviving fragments of some of the most distinguished ancient philosophers
of nature. From our point of view especially interesting is the cyclic cos-
mology of Empedocles of Acragas (VI-V century BC), in which the universe
is eternal,4 consisting of the internally immutable four classic elements, as
well as two opposing forces (Love and Strife, i.e. attractive and repulsive
interactions). The cyclic motion of matter in the universe is governed by
the change in relative intensities of the two interactions (see the excellent
discussion in O’Brien 1969). It is interesting to note that Empedocles’ cos-
mology is uniformitarian, in the sense that all six basic constituents (four
elements and two forces between them) are present in each instant of time
in accordance with the eternal principles of mutual exchange. In some of
the surviving fragments, Empedocles implies that, although this uniformi-
tarianism may seem counterintuitive, as we see things coming into being and
4It seems clear that Empedocles held a sort of the absolutist theory of the nature
of time. In particular, the fragment B16 of the Diels collection reads (according to the
translation of Burnet 1908): “For of a truth they (Strife and Love) were aforetime and
shall be; nor ever, methinks, will boundless time be emptied of that pair.”
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vanishing, this is just our special perspective (today we would say anthro-
pocentrism or observation selection effect) and not the inherent state of
nature.5 This is strikingly similar to the uniformitarian notions present in
some of the most authoritative cosmological models of the twentieth century,
and we shall return to it in subsequent discussion of the classical steady state
theory (Balashov 1994).
As discussed in some detail in C´irkovic´ (2003b), this Empedoclean view—
that biological evolution and the appearance of consciousness and intelligence
are contingent upon cosmological processes—coupled with the notion of the
eternal universe leads to the same sort of trouble as the one facing the classical
steady state theory or the one of Ellis et al. criticized by Davies. Why then,
in the supposed infinity of time, are “men and women, beasts and birds” of
finite, and relatively small, age? Where are traces of previous infinite cycles
of the ”world-machine” (cf. the discussion of Hutton in §4 below)?
Empedocles may have perceived this himself and he evades the problem
in the only natural way he can: by postulating two singular states in the
beginning and in the middle of each of his great cycles. These singular states
are moments (in the absolute time!) of complete dominance of either Love (an
ancient equivalent of the modern initial and/or final singularities) or Strife
(no true equivalent, but similar to the modern version of heat death in the
ever-expanding cosmological models; see, for instance, Davies 1994). In these
states the life, with its complex organizational structure, is impossible and
therefore they serve as termini for the duration of any individual history of
life and intelligence. In other words, the information about anything that was
before is destroyed in the singular events. Strikingly, the maximal duration of
any form of life and/or intelligence is determined exclusively by cosmological
laws! Therefore, there are no arbitrarily old beings, and anthropic argument
is inapplicable. We shall meet the same strategy over and over again in the
history of cosmological ideas.
In the very first chapter of the history of Thucydides, there is a famous
statement that before his time—i.e. about 450 BC—nothing of importance
(συ µεγαλα γευεσθαι) had happened in history. This startling state-
ment has been called “outrageous” by Oswald Spengler, and used to demon-
strate the essentially mythological character of the ancient Greek historiog-
raphy (Spengler 1918; see also Cornford 1965). It may indeed be outrageous
from the modern perspective, but it does motivate a set of deeper ques-
tions, ultimately dealing with cosmology. The fact that Thucydides did not
5Another pioneering contribution of Empedocles lies exactly in separation (the earliest
one in the Western thought!) of the physical nature and artifacts of human cognizance.
See, for instance, the Diels’ fragment B8, reading (in Burnet’s translation): “There is no
coming into being of aught that perishes, nor any end for it in baneful death; but only
mingling and change of what has been mingled. Coming into being is but a name given
to these by men.” Even more telling along the same lines are fragments B11 and B15.
6
know (or did not care to know) about previous historical events does not
change the essential perception of finiteness of human history inseparable
from the Greek thought. This property starkly conflicts with the notion
of an eternal continuously existent world, as it was presented in both
modern and ancient cultures. Obviously, it is irrelevant which exact start-
ing point we choose for unfolding historical events. In any case, the number
of these events is finite, and the timespan considered small even compared
to the specific astronomical timescales (some of which, like the precession
period of equinoxes, were known in the classical antiquity, as is clear from
the discussion in Timaeus), not to mention anything about a past temporal
infinity. Although there was no scientific archaeology in the ancient world,
it was as natural then as it is now to expect hypothetical previous civiliza-
tions inhabiting Oikumene to leave some traces—in fact, an infinite number
of traces for an eternally existent Oikumene! There are indications that
pre-Socratic thinkers have been aware of the incompatibility of this “Thucy-
didean” finiteness of historical past with the eternal nature of the world. We
have already mentioned the solution (periodic singular states) proposed by
Empedocles himself. Even earlier, in the fragmentary accounts of the cos-
mology of Anaximandros, we find an evolutionary origin of humankind in
some finite moment in the past, parallel with his basic postulate of separa-
tion of different worlds from apeiron and their subsequent returning to it.6
In Anaxagoras’ worldview, there is a famous tension between the eternity of
the world’s constituents and the finite duration of movement (and, there-
fore, relational time) in the world. In the same time, it seems certain that
Anaxagoras, together with Anaximandros and Empedocles, was an early pro-
ponent of the evolutionary view, at least regarding the origin of humankind
(Guthrie 1969).
Subsequently, with the Epicurean school, this issue became an argument
for the finite origin of the universe. Most eloquently, it has been put forward
in Roman times by Lucretius, who in the Book V of his famous poem De
Rerum Natura writes the following intriguing verses:
6This is clear, for instance, from the fragment A 10 in Diels (1983), preserved by
Plutarch, in which it is explicitly asserted that formation and destruction of many worlds
occurs within the global temporal infinity. In the continuation of the very same excerpt
from Stromateis, an evolutionary doctrine is attributed to Anaximandros: “...Farther he
says that at the beginning man was generated from all sorts of animals, since all the rest
can quickly get food for themselves, but man alone requires careful feeding for a long
time; such a being at the beginning could not have preserved his existence.” (Fairbanks
1898) Hyppolites quotes Anaximandros as emphasizing the nature of apeiron as eternal
(B 2), obviously in opposition to mankind, which has a fixed beginning in time. Even
more intriguing is the doctrine ascribed to Anaximandros by Cicero: “It was the opinion
of Anaximandros that gods have a beginning, at long intervals rising and setting, and that
they are the innumerable worlds. But who of us can think of god except as immortal?”
Did he have in mind essentially what we today denote as supercivilizations?
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Besides all this,
If there had been no origin-in-birth
Of lands and sky, and they had ever been
The everlasting, why, ere Theban war
And obsequies of Troy, have other bards
Not also chanted other high affairs?
Whither have sunk so oft so many deeds
Of heroes? Why do those deeds live no more,
Ingrafted in eternal monuments
Of glory? Verily, I guess, because
The Sun is new, and of a recent date
The nature of our universe, and had
Not long ago its own exordium.7
For scientific-minded Lucretius, the shortness of human history is very strange
on the face of hypothesis of the eternal existence of the world. Although the
reference to “eternal monuments” may sound naive, it is clear that he had in
mind any form of transmission of information from the past to the present;
and an infinite amount of information from an infinite past. His empirical
assessment clearly shows the absence of such information. Therefore, an
explanation is needed. The simplest explanation, as Lucretius was highly
aware, is to assume that the world is of finite (and relatively small) age.
This is exactly what modern cosmologists Davies and Tipler have had in
mind when constructing the anthropic argument.
2 Davies-Tipler argument: modern formula-
tion
The anthropic argument against steady-state theories hinted at by Davies
in the quotation above has been subsequently expanded and elaborated by
Tipler (1982), and it seems only just to refer to its modern form as Davies-
Tipler (henceforth DT) argument. In the latter work it has been shown that
this argument applies to ”all universes which do not change with time in the
large”, and particularly those which satisfy the so-called perfect cosmological
principle (Bondi and Gold 1948; see the discussion in the Sec. 3 below). The
discrete Markov chain recurrence of the type discussed by Ellis and Brundrit
(1979) has also been used in the discussion of Tipler (1982), although, as we
shall discuss below, its use is largely superfluous, since even a much weaker
hypothesis produces the same disastrous effects for the cosmologies with past
temporal infinities.
7In translation of William E. Leonard, available via WWW Project Gutenberg (Lu-
cretius 1997).
8
The essence of Tipler’s (1982) discussion is that, given some usual sym-
metries of spacetime, for each event p, its past light cone intersects all world
lines corresponding to the history of an intelligent species. Thus, at least
one out of an infinite number of such species, could travel along the time-
like geodesic to p (or just send signals). Since p may be any event, like our
reading of Tipler (1982) paper, or any other occurrence in the Solar system,
it is completely unexpected that we are not already part of an intelligent
community of an arbitrarily long age. For the case of the universe satisfying
the perfect cosmological principle (i.e. the classical steady state universe)
it is clearly seen from the Penrose diagram shown in Fig. 1. Again, it is
important to stress non-exclusivity of this argument: even if 99.99% (or
indeed any fraction less than unity) of intelligent communities arising at, say,
q would not expand further than some limited neighborhood q + ε, in an in-
finitely old universe there would still be at least one intelligent community
at any point p in spacetime, no matter how big |p - q| / ε is.
Here we notice that instead of dealing with temporal parts, we are dealing
with events in spacetime only. Therefore, this argument is intrinsically for-
mulated in terms of a relationist or reductionist theory of time (e.g. Newton-
Smith 1980). However, it is not contingent upon acceptance of any particular
theory of time. Both relationist and absolutist pictures can accommodate the
anthropic argument, provided that some additional specific requirements are
satisfied. Conversely, if these requirements are not satisfied, the argument
is inapplicable, no matter whether we regard time as contingent upon world
events or an absolute background to any event. In the absolutist picture, we
need to speak of infinite number of non-trivial past events in time, instead
of the time itself, which remains completely irrelevant to the argument. If
such a series of events satisfy some additional constraints (like requirement
to include the creation of life and intelligence among the physically possible
events, etc.), we are led to the same paradoxical conclusion.
However, Tipler (1982) goes farther than Davies’ casual remark given in
the context of an editorial comment, and claims that,
[s]ince all possible evolutionary sequences have occurred to the
past of p, one of these evolutionary sequences consists of the ran-
dom assembly, without assistance of any intelligent species what-
soever, of a von Neumann probe out of the atoms of interstellar
space. Such a random assembly would occur an infinite num-
ber of times to the past of p, by homogeneity and stationarity in
an infinite universe. At least one of these randomly assembled
probes would have the motivations of a living being, that is to
expand and reproduce without limit.
This scenario, although not at all fantastic, raises several questions still
lacking elaboration. How could we possibly know that the set of all ”favorably-
9
Figure 1: Conformal (Penrose) diagram of the classical steady-state universe.
Event p is arbitrarily chosen, and with A and B are denoted worldlines of
intelligent species existing within and outside of the light cone of p. (Repro-
duced with permission from Tipler 1982.)
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motivated” spontaneously assembled von Neumann probes is of non-zero
measure in the set of all such probes. The question of motivation, which
is not so easily quantifiable, becomes crucial here. For instance, why not
postulate an assembly of von Neumann probe designed to search and destroy
other von Neumann probes? What is the relative weight of colonizing (vs.
destructive, altruistic, introvert, etc.) motivation, and how can one deter-
mine it? This motivation problem is avoided if we stick to a more restrictive
requirement that only communities of evolved intelligent beings create such
probes (i.e. create them at timescales many orders of magnitude shorter
than those required for the spontaneous assembly Tipler describes). While
one may argue that motivation is necessarily linked to the level of complex-
ity, and therefore one expects the spontaneously assembled self-reproducing
automata will have basically the same motivations we perceive in biologi-
cal systems on Earth (Tipler 2001, private communication), this issue is not
clear at all.
Among the precursors of the anthropic argument of Davies and Tipler,
one may list the great British biologist, chemist, philosopher and author John
B. S. Haldane (1892−1964). His keen interest in cosmological issues has been
characterized by his defense of the Milne’s cosmological model in which (at
least according to one timescale) the universe is of finite age, and fundamental
constants change with time. In the following interesting passage, through
comparing the hypothesis of the origin of the universe in finite past vs. the
hypothesis of its eternal existence, he shows both his cosmological interests
and appreciation for a melioristic and humanistic worldview:
On the first hypothesis, why was it not created better; on the sec-
ond, why has it not got better in the course of eternity?... On nei-
ther theory have we very strong grounds for hoping that the world
will be a better place a million, let alone a thousand, years hence,
than it is today. But on Milne’s theory the laws of nature change
with time. The universe has a real history, not a series of cycles of
evolution. Although, from one point of view, the past is infinite,
life could not have started much before it did, or have got much
further than it has at the present date. If this is so, human effort
is worth while and human life has a meaning.8
If we understand “improvement” of the universe not in strictly ethical terms,9
but as increase in its complexity, the question posed by Haldane is the same
as in the DT argument. Complexity may be achieved through either tech-
8Haldane 1945; underlined by the present author.
9But presumably including that aspect. If we reject pantheism, there is a minimal level
of complexity necessary for the subject and very notion of ethics to exist. Therefore, any
ethically melioristic cosmos must satisfy specific WAP constraints.
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nologization or “biologization” of the universe, and both lead to paradoxical
consequences.
3 Two versions and related arguments
Let us introduce the following terminology. By the weak DT argumentwe
shall denote the version introduced by Davies in his 1978. note:
Weak DT: Cosmologies postulating inhabitable past temporal infinities must
be rejected due to the absence of traces of arbitrarily old civilizations in our
past light cone.
The strong version is the one presented in Tipler (1982), as well as in
monograph of Barrow and Tipler (1986). Let us formulate it by analogy with
the weak argument in the following form:
Strong DT: Cosmologies postulating past temporal infinities must be rejected
for absence of activities of spontaneously assembled self-reproducing automata
in our past light cone, provided that matter in our past light cone satisfies
constraints enabling such spontaneous assembly.
In spite of the clumsiness of the latter formulation, it is clear, upon care-
ful inspection, that the auxiliary assumptions in the stronger version are
significantly more general than those in the weak version. As far as both
versions are concerned, it is very important to notice that they do not guar-
antee the existence of the entities under consideration. Let us consider the
weak version first as the more important from the overall point of view of
this work. It contains two stringent requirements which have been usually
tacitly assumed (and played an important historical role), but which should
be explicitly discussed:
1. The requirement of continuous inhabitability of at least a large
enough region of causally connected space. This should be re-
garded as a form of restriction on spatial inhomogeneities of the cos-
mological model under consideration. The question what counts as
inhabitable is actually a very subtle one, since requirements of commu-
nities of intelligent observers may wildly differ. In any case, we expect
that a sufficiently large thermodynamical disequilibrium must exist.
Therefore, the question whether a particular model satisfies this auxil-
iary assumption is contingent upon the answer from the same model to
the much more famous problem of Olbers’ paradox. We shall see be-
low how various specific cosmological models enable continuous entropy
production over an infinite interval of time.
2. The existence of arbitrarily old civilizations. The existence of
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such entities can hardly be considered obvious or even probable on any
count. While the condition 1. is necessary, it is not a sufficient reason
for accepting 2. Obviously, apart from the physical environment, there
are other reasons of a subtler and less quantifiable nature which could
put an upper limit to the age and growth of civilizations even in a
continuously inhabitable universe.
Now we perceive what is the ultimate recourse to the proponents of large-
scale stationarity (as well as opponents of the usage of anthropic principle
for discriminating between the cosmological models). While the rejection of
either 1. or 2. may seem easy enough, the careful inspection shows that it
is a rather difficult endeavor. Models which are characterized as stationary
automatically satisfy 1., and the reasons sometimes cited for rejection of
2.—mostly in the context of the SETI debate (see below)—are entirely ad
hoc. Non-stationary models may violate 1., while retaining infinite number of
past temporal events, although this violation is necessarily limited by spatial
and temporal scales our observations are probing. Limits following from the
observations are already too relaxed for us to conclude that this is a sufficient
reason for the rejection of 1., even apart from the fact that no infinitely old
non-stationary model has ever been investigated in much detail.
The strong DT argument necessarily endorses a following auxiliary as-
sumption, analogous with the 1. in the weak case:
1. ’ The requirement of a continuously existing region in which
the spontaneous assembly of matter can be achieved. This
presumes (i) availability of matter (so that empty models, like the de
Sitter world, can be excluded), and (ii) restrictions on the physical
state of matter. This second restrictions is hard to make precise in
the general case, but it seems clear that we should exclude cases, for
instance, in which the matter is at temperatures high enough for any
level of organization to be immediately destroyed by thermal motions.
It is generally much more difficult to construct an infinitely old cosmolog-
ical model violating 1’ so that it can be brought even into a very superficial
accord with the empirical data which any realistic theory must satisfy. How-
ever, since the physical issues involving a spontaneous assembly of the desired
sort are not clear, we shall in further discussion concentrate on the weak ver-
sion of the argument, while only occasionally referring to the stronger version.
More stringent requirements 1. and 2. produce make, for that matter, any
hunt for loopholes in the argument itself (and our consequent increase in
understanding) much more promising.
For the sake of better understanding of the issues involved, let us consider
a counterexample of a cosmological model involving past temporal infinity
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which DT argument does not apply to.10 This is the Lemaˆıtre-Eddington
universe, which was quite popular in the 1925-1935 period (e.g. Eddington
1930). This model belongs to the class of general-relativistic models with
cosmological constant and without the Big Bang. Therefore, it was very
appealing from the point of view of resolving the age discrepancies between
cosmological models and various astrophysical and geological timescales (Bok
1946; Kragh 1996). A good description of this model can be found in Bondi’s
classic textbook on cosmology (Bondi 1961). Having appeared on the cos-
mological scene after the realization of the instability of the original Einstein
static universe (Einstein 1917), this model
...has therefore an infinite past which was spent in the Einstein
state. This has greatly attracted investigators since it seemingly
permits an arbitrarily long timescale of evolution. The picture of
the history of the universe derived from this model, then, was that
for an infinite period in the distant past there was a completely
homogeneous distribution of matter in equilibrium in the Einstein
state until some event started off the expansion, which has been
going on at an increasing pace ever since. The condensation of
the galaxies and the stars from the primeval matter took place at
the time the expansion began, but this development was stopped
later by the decrease of average density due to the progress of the
expansion.11
This model is a good physical representation of the situation often con-
sidered in philosophical studies of distinction between the relationist and
absolutist theories of time: the situation in which an absolutely unchanged
universe suddenly transforms into changing world we observe (e.g. Hinckfuss
1975). From the formal point of view, in accordance with the Weyl postulate,
the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre universe has an infinite past, i.e. the initial state is
given by the formal limit t → −∞. However, this is a “false” infinity, at
least in the context of anthropic reasoning, because the period of time in
which there are conditions enabling the creation of intelligent observers is
necessarily finite. In addition, this period is approximately equal to the time
past since the beginning of the expansion. In the Leibnitz-Berkeley-Machian
relationist picture, the time itself does not really exist before the onset of in-
stabilities, i.e. the universal expansion. The period of complete homogeneity
can be regarded as a state analogous to the epochs of complete dominance
of Love or Strife in the cosmology of Empedocles or, even more accurately
to the time before the motion began in Anaxagoras’ cosmology.12 In both
10For a preliminary treatment of this topic, see C´irkovic´ 2000.
11Bondi (1961), p. 118.
12The fragment B64 of Diels suggests that Anaxagoras endorsed a version of what were
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cosmologies it is necessary to invoke a state which prevents propagation of in-
formation from an arbitrarily distant past to the present epoch. In both cases
this goal is achieved by postulating states with a sufficiently high degree of
symmetry.13 Obviously, in the case of the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre universe, the
anthropic argument is inapplicable, since the effective past is finite. Intel-
ligent observers (or spontaneously assembled von Neumann probes!) possess
only a finite time for technologization of their cosmic environment. This is
valid for the generic version of the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre model. Of course, the
model pretending to describe the real universe is normalized to the present
expansion rate, and therefore we conclude that this effective age is similar to
the age of galaxies, or again of the order of H−10 (H0 being the present-day
measured value of the Hubble “constant”). Therefore, the incompatibility
argument in the core of the DT argument is lost and reduces to the much
weaker Fermi “paradox”, as we shall see in the further discussion.
Probably the more physical and meaningful way of restating the entire
situation is to reject the notion of an infinite age of the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre
model as a hollow formalism. A principle sometimes ascribed to Aristotle or
St. Augustine tells us that there is no time without a changeable world. The
state of perfect equilibrium in the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre model in the t→ −∞
limit is exactly such an unchangeable state, without means of determining
either direction or the rate of passage of time. In the sense of a modal version
of the Aristotle-Augustine principle, the temporal infinity in this model thus
collapses into a purely formal notion. Newton-Smith’s formulation of this
principle:
There is a period of time between the events E1 and E2 if and
only if relative to these events it is possible for some event or
events to occur between them,14
explicitly points out to (macroscopic) indistinguishability of moments in the
state of complete thermodynamical equilibrium. The same applies to the dis-
tant future of the universe in which, according to many models, the state of
to become the absolutist or Newtonian (or Platonist in Newton-Smith’s parlance) theory of
time. In this description of Anaxagoras’ cosmology, preserved in Simplicius’ commentaries
on Aristotle’s Physics, it is emphasized that the world itself was created at the beginning
of motion, but that before that time everything was static. As in Eddington-Lemaˆıtre
universe, the time axis can be formally extended backwards to −∞.
13Of course, this interpretation of the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre universe is not mandatory.
It may as well be said that stars and galaxies have existed indefinitely as such before
the expansions starts. Of course, in this case the anthropic argument becomes valid at
any epoch in the finite past, even before the start of the expansion, since it reduces to
the application in the static Einstein universe. However, there are additional arguments
against such interpretation of the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre model. For instance, as shown in
an instructive study by Pegg (1971), the model with indefinite past containing stars can
be rejected as a consequence of a very grave form of the Olbers’ paradox.
14Newton-Smith (1980), p. 44.
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heat death is bound to occur. Barrow and Tipler (1978), suggest that a for-
mally infinite future should be substituted with a finite interval, through an
appropriate coordinate transformation. A sort of counterexample, confirm-
ing the general thesis that the cosmic time established by the Weyl postulate
should not be regarded as sacrosanct, is the diverging number of (possible)
events in the finite temporal vicinity of either the initial or final global sin-
gularity. In such a situation a finite cosmic time may be less appropriate
than an alternative infinite timescale (e.g. Misner 1969).15 For instance, the
ever-decreasing number of events in the world approaching future heat death
(in the framework of some particular cosmological model) could well be de-
scribed, in the relationist picture, with the finite time interval remaining;
therefore, the time between the initial singularity and the final heat death
could be represented by a (-∞, 0) interval.
Is such a rescaling just a mathematico-philosophical perversion lacking
any relevance for the physical world? It seems that the answer is firmly in the
negative. While the elaboration lies beyond the scope of the present paper,
it is enough to point out that the famous ”biological scaling hypothesis” of
Freeman Dyson is just one guise of the re-scaling of time in the relationist
context (Dyson 1979). Many results in the nascent discipline of physical
eschatology depend on the Dyson’s hypothesis, and it is obvious that it’s
being true or else has a real, physical consequences.
In brief, the past temporal infinity in the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre model is
trivial from the anthropic point of view, and therefore DT argument is
inapplicable. Thus, one should reduce the realm of applicability of the latter
argument to cosmological models containing non-trivial past infinities,
i.e. an infinite chain of non-trivial events.16 The residual problem in each
case is what is traditionally called Fermi’s (or the ”Great Silence”) paradox.
It should be immediately noted that DT argument, as outlined above, is
different from the unlimited entropy argument usually used against cosmolo-
gies with past infinities (although the two are related, as we shall see): why
haven’t irreversible processes, in accordance with the thermodynamical laws,
generated infinite amounts of entropy in the universe by now? This is not
just the classical question of the thermodynamical disequilibrium between the
dark night sky and bright stars, but also the question of our very existence,
which is obviously contingent upon the large-scale disequilibrium. Davies
15This obtained a poetic description in Lord Byron’s Cain (1821):
With us acts are exempt from time, and we
Can crowd eternity into an hour,
Or stretch an hour into eternity.
16Further discussion of the non-triviality requirement can be found in Newton-Smith
(1980). It is important, for instance, in rejecting claims that statements of the form
“the moment t = t0 is now” can in principle describe any event whatsoever. Here we
perceive the connection between the anthropic argument and the relationist vs. absolutist
controversy in the most plastic manner.
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himself used the same argument against the Hoyle-Narlikar conformally in-
variant cosmology17 in his review of the latter in Nature (Davies 1975), and
Tipler (1982) mentions it in somewhat restricted sense, as Olbers’ paradox
(again, expanded discussion may be found in Barrow and Tipler 1986). The
classical steady-state theory alleviates this problem by the continuous cre-
ation of matter, and an additional assumption that newly created matter is in
a low-entropy state. But cosmologies excluding creation of matter (such as,
for instance, the Einstein original static universe, or the Hoyle-Narlikar con-
formally invariant cosmology) are faced with this argument in a very serious
form. Still, this thermodynamical argument against steady-state models is
qualitatively different from DT argument we are dealing with, although both
show how difficulties arise when currently observable processes are extrapo-
lated backward in the past eternity. The latter argument is based, essentially,
on the diametrically opposed process: growth of complexity, which results in
emergence of technological communities at some finite time (Kardashev and
Strelnitskij 1988). In the former case, we perceive increases in entropy in
our laboratory experiments; in the latter case, we perceive our laboratories
themselves as—in a sense—the very products of our former observations.
In addition, attempts to reject the hypothesis of the infinite age of the
universe by a Kantian form of a priori reasoning are essentially different from
the anthropic argument; the former is also known as the kalam cosmolog-
ical argument (Craig 1979). One of the latest of these attempts has been
made by Gerald Whitrow (1978), which immediately caused many, chiefly
negative, reactions (Popper 1978; Bell 1979; Davies 1983; Gru¨nbaum 1991;
Oppy 1995; see, however, Craig 1979, 1990). DT argument, on the contrary,
is not a priori : it applies to the physically well-defined sub-class of universes
with infinite past and it is firmly based in empirical (though non-standard)
evidence—the one on the existence of a technological civilization in vicinity
of at least one point of spacetime.
Thus, DT argument can be interpreted as the much stronger version of
the familiar “Great Silence” or “astrosociological” problem (e.g. Brin 1983;
Kardashev and Strelnitskij 1988; Almar 1989; Gindilis and Rudnitskii 1993;
Lipunov 1997; also known as the Fermi’s “paradox”). Fermi’s legendary
question “Where are they?” applies to the absence of any observable tech-
nologization of the universe, as confronted by optimistic views on the multi-
17There is a slight confusion in the literature as to which of several different cosmological
models is correctly called the Hoyle-Narlikar cosmology. Here, we attach this name only
to the conformally invariant model with a conserved number of particles and variable
particle masses, such as exposed in Hoyle and Narlikar (1972) and Hoyle (1975) papers.
Although, as shown by Narlikar and Arp (1993), several features of this model can be
incorporated into the revised steady state theory (which postulates creation of matter,
i.e. non-conservation of the number of particles), we shall explicitly treat Hoyle-Narlikar
and the revised steady-state as separate theories, since the distinction (conservation vs.
creation) seems important enough.
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tude of advanced extraterrestrial civilizations in our Galaxy.18 As calculated
by many researchers (starting with the pioneering study of Hart 1975), the
timescale for the colonization of the Milky Way galaxy by a technological
society only a very little ahead of us in the technological sense is very much
smaller than the age of our Galaxy. The age of the Galaxy is, of course, finite
and became rather well-known in recent years (Chaboyer et al. 1996, 1998;
Krauss 1998), and exactly that is the point at which the anthropic argument
is much more severe. As put dramatically by Lipunov (1997):
There are two observational... facts: (1) the age of the uni-
verse is T = 1010 years and (2) the time τ for the exponential de-
velopment of our civilization is of the order of some tens of years.
For the sake of simplicity, we can adopt τ = 100 years, which
is obviously an overestimate. A gigantic dimensionless number
arises, characterizing the growth of a technological civilization
over the time of existence of the universe:
K = exp(T/τ) ≈ 1043,000,000 (!)
It is sufficient to say that theoretical physics has never dealt with
such large dimensionless numbers... In fact, it can be confirmed
that the probability of absence of “space miracles” in our universe
is 10−43,000,000, i.e., it is equal to zero! Nevertheless, nobody has
discovered them even after 20 years of searches. On the contrary,
a Great Silence of the universe has been revealed.
The extension of this argument on both spatial and temporal scales leads
directly to the anthropic argument. Instead of a very large age, we wish
to investigate the limit T → ∞ (in Lipunov’s presentation). Clearly, the
DT argument (as well as practically all other aspects of anthropic reasoning)
is of great relevance not only for cosmology, but for astrobiology and the
prospects for SETI, too. Since the latter topics are of potentially unprecedent
significance to the social and cultural history of human race, this reaffirms the
necessity of investigating all arguments of relevance to the question of survival
and evolutionary histories of intelligent observers in the cosmological context.
This is a convenient point to reemphasize that (as noted among others, by
Lipunov himself) before Einstein and Friedmann—but after the breakdown
of the medieval creation dogma—there were no principal differences between
the two arguments. The traditional view of XVIII, XIX and early XX century
intellectuals has been that the universe has always existed in conditions not
18The similarities between the Olbers’ and Fermi “paradoxes” has been discused by
Almar (1989). For our purposes the most important fact is that in both cases it is the
finite age of the universe and not it expansion which is the dominant physical factor
(Wesson et al. 1987).
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very different from those observable around us today. This makes the fact
that the DT argument appeared on the cosmological scene so late rather
strange.
4 An Earth science interlude
Could it appear earlier? It is important to stress that the more general
problem of lack of information from the past has its underground history
deeply interwoven with the striving for understanding natural history. The
problem, as he have hinted, was open as soon as the dogma of creation in
4004 BC was rejected, openly or tacitly. It was, in fact, in the domain of
Earth science (rather than in astronomy) where the dam was broken: it is
often called the discovery of ”deep time” or ”geological time” (e.g. Ward
1998; Baxter 2004). And it was not accidental that the man usually credited
for this discovery, Scottish naturalist James Hutton (1726−1797), was the
first to reflect on the basic issue of habitability of the indefinitely (or even
infinitely) old universe.
Following the lead of Gould (1987), we may approach Hutton’s solution of
the problem of the duration of the past vs. limited information transmitted
from those epochs, noting how final causes motivate the whole idea; today, we
might cite the Strong Anthropic Principle to the similar ends. Hutton imag-
ined a ”world machine”: his mechanicistic worldview found excellent field of
applicability in the geology of his day. Erosion of the soil is compensated
by the uplifting of mountains; any other particular tendency is contrasted
with an opposite one which is bound to return the world to one or more
previous stages. Hutton’s vision is a geological analog of the Empedoclean
cyclic universe; hence the most famous passage of his, ending the 1788 short
version of his Theory of the Earth:
If the succession of worlds is established in the system of nature,
it is in vain to look for anything higher in the origin of the earth.
The result, therefore, of our present enquiry is that we find no
vestige of a beginning—no prospect of an end.19
But, contrary to the standard textbook (and often quite Whiggish) history,
portraying Hutton as the standard-bearer of modern scientific outlook, this
view of the ”world-machine” was not motivated so much by the desire to
explain the observed phenomena, as by the metaphysical invocation of final
causes. The final cause in question was nothing less than what modern
astrobiologists would call planetary habitability: time and again, Hutton
writes of ”mechanism of the globe, by which it is adapted to the purpose
of being a habitable world.” The Earth was obviously constructed (at some
19Hutton (1788), p. 304.
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indefinite epoch, not existing from eternity!) for higher purpose of being a
habitat for life and, eventually, for human domination. Hutton writes about
...a world contrived in consummate wisdom for the growth and
habitation of a great diversity of plants and animals; and a world
peculiarly adapted to the purpose of man, who inhabits all its
climates, who measures its extent, and determines its productions
at his pleasure.20
This seems absurd from the (Whiggish!) point of view of modernity, but was
almost self-evident in XVIII century; on the other hand, Hutton’s view bears
striking similarity to some of the modern teleological usages of the Strong
Anthropic Principle we shall discuss in §7 below.
Note that the age of the Earth (and perhaps the rest of the universe)
was considered indefinite, but not infinite. Infinite age would conflict with
Hutton’s profound Christian religiosity, and he repeatedly implies that the
ultimate questions of the beginning and the end of the world are not part
of the scientific discourse. However, with profound subtlety, he builds an
insurance against Lucretian ”eternal monuments” in his choice of words:
not that there is no beginning—there are only no vestige of the beginning!
The cyclic nature of the world machine erases the relevant information from
previous cycles and ”cleans the slate”. But it is still internally inconsistent:
if the world is made for man, how comes that the achievements of previous
generations of humans are also erased? And if we accept pluralism about
abodes of life (which was rather standard in Hutton’s time; see, for instance,
Fontenelle 1767), than it is very difficult to conceive an explanation for the
failure of intelligent beings to overcome the slow processes of erosion and
decay which erase information from previous cycles. Empedocles at least
postulated catastrophic, singular events encompassing the entire universe;
Hutton’s world machine is much less efficient in this respect. This dichotomy
is important to keep in mind before we return to the grand cosmological
scene.
5 Classical Steady-State Theory
In order to better assess the importance of DT argument and its application
to the cosmologies with infinite past, we shall briefly consider the conceptual
foundations of the most famous and historically most influential such cos-
mology, the 1948. model of Hermann Bondi, Thomas Gold and Fred Hoyle
(Bondi and Gold 1948; Hoyle 1948). Although there is some controversy
whether the classical steady-state cosmology represented a single entity or
two disjointed theories (that of Bondi-Gold and the version of Hoyle), we shall
20Hutton (1788), pp. 294-295.
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refer to them as the classical steady-state model, discussing, where relevant,
particular differences among the two versions (Hoyle 1949). While Hoyle’s
version is generally superior, being formulated in the language of the classical
field theory, for our purposes it is, in fact, the perfect cosmological principle
(henceforth PCP) of Bondi and Gold (1948) that makes the important point
most clearly. Its essentially non-mathematical character makes it even more
transparent in the sense of giving the core formulation of uniformitarianism
in cosmology (Balashov 1994).
One fact that remained largely overlooked is that the classical steady-state
cosmology displayed one of the very first instances of anthropic reasoning
in modern science. In the founding paper, Bondi and Gold (1948) gave a
specific anthropic flavor to the classical unlimited entropy argument (”Olbers’
paradox”):
A static universe would clearly reach thermodynamical equi-
librium after some time. An infinitely old universe would cer-
tainly be in this state. There would be complete equilibrium be-
tween matter and radiation, and (apart possibly from some slight
variations due to gravitational potentials) everything would be at
one and the same temperature. There would be no evolution, no
distinguishing features, no recognizable direction of time. That
our universe is not of this type is clear not only from astronomi-
cal observations but from local physics and indeed from our very
existence. [present author’s emphasis]
This way of reasoning is not only deeply founded in the normative phys-
ical practice, but is directly responsible for the conceptual simplicity of the
classical steady-state, praised even by its adversaries such as Sir Martin Ryle.
However, it is also important to perceive that the paragraph quoted above
contains a characteristic example of the anti-Empedoclean double standard
deeply rooted in modern science. Namely, our existence is taken into account
in physical theory when it is convenient, in this particular example when it
comes to proving that the entropy of the universe is far from the maximal
value. At the same time, other consequences of our existence as a technolog-
ical civilization, which lead to the DT argument, are conveniently ignored.
It can be hardly contested that it was exactly our capability to adapt and
technologize nature which led, among all other things, to advances in mathe-
matics and astronomy leading to the formulation of the classical steady-state
theory. In what follows, we shall show how the DT argument is operational-
ized in the context of this theory.
PCP formulated by Bondi and Gold (1948), can be simply expressed as
the homogeneity of the universe in 4-dimensional spacetime. This is just
the generalization of so-called Cosmological principle (cf. Milne 1940), which
assumes homogeneity in space, but not necessarily in time. Mathematically
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speaking, PCP can be formulated as a necessity to have a timelike Killing
vector in the classical Robertson-Walker metric. Thus, PCP leads to the
line-element of the well-known (de Sitter) form (in usual c = 1 units):
ds2 = dt2 − e2Ht
[
dr2 + r2
(
dϑ2 + sin2 ϑ dϕ2
)]
, (1)
where H is the true constant, and can take any real value. Now, H = 0 leads
to a static universe, which can be discarded not only on clear observational
grounds, but (even more interesting from our point of view) from the thermo-
dynamical considerations as well. Olbers’ paradox testifies that the universe
has not reached the state of thermodynamical equilibrium, which is impossi-
ble to avoid in an infinitely old static cosmological model (see the celebrated
classic discussion in Bondi 1961).21 The case H < 0, which corresponds
to the universal contraction, presents a situation in which the radiation of
distant sources is shifted to the violet end of the spectrum, resulting in an
infinitely bright sky background in the manner still less acceptable than in
the case of Olbers’ paradox in the static universe. Therefore, the only pos-
sible conclusion is that H > 0, which is the realistic case of the expanding
universe.
Part of the appeal of the steady-state concept can be found in words of
Sciama (quoted according to Kragh 1996):
The steady-state theory opens up the exciting possibility that
the laws of physics may indeed determine the contents of the
universe through the requirement that all features of the universe
be self-propagating... The requirement of self-propagation is thus
a powerful new principle with whose aid we see for the first time
the possibility of answering the question why things are as they
are without merely saying: it is because they were as they were.
21TheH = 0 case corresponds to infinite euclidean static universe, similar to the Einstein
original static model (Einstein 1917). The difference lies in topology, since the Einstein
model is topologically closed. However, the Einstein model also (albeit trivially) satisfies
the Perfect Cosmological Principle. Although we can not delve deeper into this topic, it
is worth noticing that DT argument applies to flat euclidean as well as Einstein closed
static models. The absence of the large-scale expansion in these static models makes the
expansion of life and intelligence significantly easier. Even the hierarchical distribution
of galaxies and supergalactic structures, like in Charlier original fractal model (Charlier
1922; Kalitzin 1961) or in Segal’s chronometric cosmology (e.g. Segal 1978), does not
alleviate this problem. No distance is out of reach in an infinitely old static universe.
Moreover, we may speculate, following Barrow and Tipler (1986), that the absence of
global relativistic effects like shear and torsion in such universes makes the technologization
of ever larger spatial volumes even more important, since there are no negentropy sources
for information processing other than the matter fields. Of course, the basic problem of
all static cosmologies is Olbers’ paradox, i.e. global thermodynamical disequilibrium, so in
a sense the existence of even a single intelligent observer is reductio ad absurdum of such
cosmologies!
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However, as we shall see below, the germ of doom lies exactly in the concept
of self-propagation, since it seems to be incapable of correctly accounting for
a specific ”feature” of the universe, namely us. In other words, if we accept
the Empedoclean picture (in which the biological and mental evolution is an
inherent and necessary part of the cosmological evolution), than although it
has to be self-propagating, the rise of intelligence at the same time must
not be self-propagating.
The basic violations of uniformity we empirically notice in the universe are
galaxies. Newly created matter is continuously condensed in galaxies, and
although the details of this process have remained controversial (Sciama 1955;
Harwit 1961), mainly because insufficient theoretical work was devoted to it
prior to the universal rejection of the steady-state picture in mid-1960s, the
predictive power of PCP is manifested here once again. The answer offered by
the steady-state outlook to the question of the age distribution of galaxies on
a sufficiently large scale is essentially independent of physical details of galaxy
formation. In the classical steady-state model, the distribution function of
galaxies is simply
f (x) = e−3Ht, (2)
where H is the Hubble constant, a true constant in contradistinction to the
Friedmann models. Taking into account Eq. (2) the average age of galaxies
is simply
〈τ〉 =
1
n
∞∫
0
3nH e−3Hαdα =
1
3
H−1. (3)
This illustrates a beautiful simplicity which PCP imposes on the theory: the
average age of galaxies is calculated without any reference to the compli-
cated physics of galaxy formation.22 However, we should keep in mind a
historical fact of great importance: the estimates of the Hubble constant
relevant in the late 1940s were in gross violation of what we today know
as the plausible interval for that quantity. For H ∼ 500 km s−1, which
was the then reigning Hubble measurement, the Friedman-Lemaˆıtre cosmol-
ogy (which soon became, following a derogatory comment of Fred Hoyle in
22Parenthetically, modern Big Bang cosmologies are still uncertain as to the average
predicted age of galaxies within a factor of about two (see, for instance, Gott 1977;
Peebles 1993). Note that this is something very different from the observational uncer-
tainties in determination of, say, age of the oldest globular clusters in the Galaxy. The
latter is in practice regarded as limes inferior of the age of the universe. The two are
sometimes confused, especially in popular scientific literature, due to the hegemonic po-
sition of the standard hot Big Bang paradigm. A priori, it is not necessary that age of
Galaxy (and galaxies) is determined by cosmological factors at all; classical steady-state
cosmology is a good such counterexample. In it the age of any chosen galaxy is a random
variable. However, in the standard model it is the irreversibility of the Hubble expansion
(i.e. the cosmological “arrow of time”) which necessarily links cosmology with galactic
cosmogony. This, of course, does not imply that the classical steady-state model does not
have inherent difficulties with the physics of galaxy formation (e.g. Harwit 1961).
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a BBC radio broadcast, the Big Bang cosmology) has had a serious conflict
with the age of the Earth and chemical elements (e.g. Bok 1946). At the time
of formulation of the steady-state theory, 〈τ〉 was considered small (∼ 6×108
yrs, due to the gross overestimate of the value of Hubble constant), and the
Milky Way has already been an extraordinary old galaxy, which certainly
implied that surrounding galaxies are far less probable to achieve the same
degree of chemical and biological evolution. Although this circumstance in
fact does not alleviate the DT argument, it certainly does have a significant
psychological effect, making problems with technologization literally much
more distant.
The fraction δ(t) of galaxies older than the age t is given by
δ (t) =
1
n
∞∫
t
3nH e−3Hxdx = e−3Ht, (4)
This is the mathematical root of the problem, reflecting the fact that the
exponential function is everywhere finite. For instance, if we take 〈τ〉 to be
an order of magnitude higher, in accordance with the today’s best knowledge
on the magnitude of the Hubble constant, DT argument quoted above gains
force. Since the fraction of galaxies that are older than age t = 2 × tMW ≈
2× 1.2× 1010 yrs is given by Eq. (4), it follows that there are almost 2% of
all galaxies in any large enough comoving volume which are twice the age
of the Milky Way. We should keep in mind at all times that our Galaxy
is already old enough for the Fermi’s paradox to be formulated (as briefly
discussed in §2).
The issue of different predictions of ages of galaxies in different cosmo-
logical models has been present on the cosmological scene since the very
beginning of controversy between the classical steady-state and what will
ultimately be called the standard Big Bang model. This problem is attrac-
tive because of the possibility of observational verification on spatial scales
smaller than those required for most of the other cosmological tests. Stud-
ies of convenient age indicators in a large enough sample of galaxies could,
in principle, be performed in order to answer the question whether galaxies
have approximately the same age, or span a wide distribution, as given by Eq.
(2). In practical terms, however, the task is extremely difficult, since even the
age of the Milky Way (by far the best known galaxy, of course) has not been
known with less than 20% uncertainty until very recently. Therefore this sort
of empirical evidence has not been actually used very much against the clas-
sical steady-state model. The age-based attack on the steady-state theory
was initiated by Gamow, who in a short note in 1954 (Gamow 1954), pointed
out that after the Baade’s revision of cosmological distance and timescales,
steady-state theory faces the problem of underestimating ages of galaxies in
our vicinity. However, it is clear in the Gamow paper that he does not find
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the so far measured galactic ages very convincing. The same age discrep-
ancy issue has been raised by the great American observational astronomer,
Ivan King, who in 1961 pointed out that the ages of stellar populations in
most of nearby galaxies are estimated to be about 2H−10 , which is not in
agreement with the first order prediction of the steady-state theory (King
1961). In a short, but very comprehensive reply to this objection, Hoyle
and Narlikar have suggested several weaknesses in this argument and put
forward at least one problem which outlived the cosmological controversy
and remains puzzling to this day (Hoyle and Narlikar 1962). First of all,
they pointed out that judging confidently the age of galaxies means knowing
with certainty the evolutionary effects dictated by intragalactic physics. As
a crucial example, they offer uncertain status of the morphological types of
galaxies: are they constants for all times, or do they change with cosmic
time? The latter alternative precludes any conclusion based on assumptions
relating stellar populations with the morphological type (a standard proce-
dure in astrophysics) unless we know the exact law of evolutionary change.
It is interesting to note that Hoyle and Narlikar in connection with this point
suggest a scheme of transformation of Hubble’s morphological types which is
still an acceptable hypothesis today. Some observational indications to that
effect, as well as theoretical explanations bearing on the nature of dark mat-
ter, have only recently been reported (Braine and Combes 1993; Pfenniger,
Combes and Martinet 1994).
Finally, Hoyle and Narlikar in their 1962 paper indicate (in close connec-
tion with their subsequent “radical departure”; see Hoyle and Narlikar 1966)
the possibility of temporal correlations due to collective effects. This idea
will be realized in detail in the so-called revised or quasi-steady state model
of 1990s. If galaxies are formed in groups (i.e. on the higher level of struc-
ture), it may be assumed that the galactic ages are correlated. Therefore,
it is natural to expect that galaxies in the vicinity of the Milky Way (those
amenable to detailed observations and age measurements) will have similar
ages (both among themselves, and in comparison with our Galaxy).
6 Closed Steady State Models
As we have discussed in the introductory part of this study, the DT argument
has been used for the first time against a stationary cosmological model with
closed topology advanced by George F. R. Ellis and his collaborators (Ellis
1978; Ellis et al. 1978). A similar cosmological model has been developed
in the mid-1990s by American physicist Peter Phillips (1994a, b). These
models, sharing several key similarities, we shall call the closed steady-
state models. Their basic characteristic is that stationarity is achieved
by rejection of the “usual” cosmological principle (not to mention PCP).
In other words, the temporal steady-state is paid for by abandoning spatial
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homogeneity.23 It is a matter of philosophical taste whether one considers
the price too high or not.24 However, it is difficult to avoid being disturbed
by elaboration of Ellis et al. that
while isotropy is directly observable, homogeneity (on a cosmo-
logical scale) is not. In the standard discussions the assumption
of homogeneity is made a priori, either directly, or in some equiv-
alent form (e.g. as the assumption that the Universe is isotropic
for all observers...), and so is not subjected to observational ver-
ification. Accordingly, the standard ’proof’ of the expansion of
the Universe is based on an unverified a priori assumption.
With the intention of investigating consequences of abandoning the ho-
mogeneity postulate and retaining Einstein field equations, Ellis and his col-
laborators have reached a model of a topologically closed universe with two
privileged “points”. We are located near one them, and that is not acciden-
tal, because (in accordance with WAP) it is expected for us to be located in
the regions possessing the necessary properties for the origination and evo-
lution of complex (biological) systems. This occurs near the “center” of the
universe (it is most natural to use the term for our pole of the manifold, by
analogy with a 3-sphere). Opposite of the center is located the singularity
surrounded by hot matter, simulating in this manner the initial singularity in
the Friedmann models. However, in this static model, the singularity is co-
present with everything that exists, not preceding it. Obviously, it makes
the model more appealing from the epistemological point of view: although
laws of nature break down at singularity, in Ellis et al. model it is not for-
ever inaccessible in the past, but could, in principle, be investigated using the
methods and apparatus of modern science. This co-present singularity can
be intuitively understood as being the “enclosure” or “mantle” surrounding
the universe. Its major purpose is to play the role of a recycling facility
in the global cosmological ecology, since the static nature of the universe
makes recycling of high-entropy matter necessary. In the framework of this
model it is achieved through a streaming of high-entropy matter (mainly in
23In this sense, they do not contradict the statement that the classical steady-state
model is unique, i.e. that there is only one cosmology satisfying PCP, as Bondi was fond
of emphasizing (e.g. Bondi 1961). This methodological advantage of the classical steady
state model over all other cosmological models remains unscathed. As we shall see, closed
steady state models are forced to invoke WAP for explaining the highly special nature of
our view of the universe. For the same task, in both the Friedmann models and in the
classical steady-state case, Occam’s razor is strong enough.
24This is quite independent from the fact that closed steady state cosmologies do not
satisfy observational constraints and can be considered rejected today. As far as the plau-
sibility of the hypothesis that the observable universe is a homogeneous part of the much
larger inhomogeneous whole, see for instance Harwit (1995). This feature is inherent to
some variants of the inflationary scenario, most notably Linde’s chaotic inflation program.
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the form of heavy elements synthesized in stellar nucleosynthesis) toward the
singularity, where it is dissociated and returned to the universe in the form
of low-entropy matter (presumably hot single baryons). In this manner the
total entropy stays the same at all epochs. Beside this streaming (which does
not change the net mass distribution), there is no systematic motion: observ-
able redshift is of purely gravitational origin. The co-present singularity in
Ellis et al. model bears a resemblance to the apeiron of Anaximandros out
of which worlds are formed and unto which they ultimately dissociate.
In the cosmological model of Phillips (1994a, b) there are also two singular
points, this time called the northern and southern pole. The Milky Way
galaxy is located in close proximity to the northern pole of the universe (from
the same anthropic reasons as in the Ellis et al. model). In contradistinction
to the Ellis et al. model, here we have a systematic motion of galaxies, in
direction from the northern to the southern pole. This motion, however,
is laminar and stationary, so that the universe in general always offers the
same picture to a typical observer. Metric coefficients are independent of
time, and in this sense the model could be considered static. This is a
situation somewhat similar to the famous de Sitter cosmological solution for
an empty universe, which is nominally static, although we now interpret
it as describing the exponential expansion. Since this large-scale motion is
present, the observed redshift is partially of gravitational and partially of
Doppler origin. In the Phillips’ model there are two postulated types of
matter, which he calls primary and secondary matter, where the matter to
which we are accustomed to is of secondary type. Primary matter is moving
in the opposite direction (from the southern to the northern pole), so that
the generalized form of matter conservation is preserved, while the two types
of matter never interact except in singular points at the poles. The details
of thermodynamics of this model have been elaborated in better detail than
in the Ellis et al. model (Phillips 1994b), wherein some observational tests
of this version of closed stationary models have been proposed.
These empirical tests are fatal to closed stationary models. In the very
original paper of Ellis et al. (1978), it is shown that this model is not able to
account properly for the so-called (m, z) curve, i.e. the relationship between
the apparent magnitude and redshift of cosmologically distributed sources
of radiation. It is harder to disprove Phillips’ model, since the gravitational
and Doppler redshifts are delicately entangled. The cleanest test could be
the measurement of peculiar motion of distant sources with respect to the
universal reference frame as defined by the microwave background radiation.
This experiment is possible to perform in the case of rich galaxy clusters, by
means of the Sunyaev-Zeldovich effect (Sunyaev and Zeldovich 1980). The
prediction of Phillips’ model is that more distant clusters will tend to have
significantly larger peculiar motions than those nearby. Recent measurements
indicate that this is not the case, and there is no meaningful way to save the
27
theory (Phillips 2001, private communication). Therefore, we may consider
stationary closed cosmologies to be rejected by observations.
However, they are useful for us in the historical sense. DT argument
against them continues to hold and is even more forceful than for the case of
the classical steady-state. It is reasonable to assume that in closed universes,
the cross-section for contact (and technologization) of an advanced civiliza-
tion could literally cover a large fraction of the entire universe. Since our
position is necessarily privileged in these universes (hence we observe galax-
ies and the limiting singularity to be nearly isotropic around our position), it
is only plausible to assume that the same anthropic reasons which establish
such a situation are acting for any intelligent community which could ever
arise in such a universe. But in that case, where the choice of places of birth
of intelligent observers is necessarily finite, it is very easy to see that the
world line of any civilization older than ours will pass through the present of
the Solar system. And in these models, again, conditions for the emergence
of intelligent observers (in a limited spatial region, admittedly) persist for an
infinite time, and arbitrarily old civilizations are a possibility. The difference
in the nature of large-scale motions in the two models considered is irrelevant
for our purposes, since the peculiar motions of nearby (with respect to any
intelligent observers) galaxies are in any case much smaller than the rate by
which the contact cross-section for advanced civilization increases.
One could imagine the situation in which an advanced civilization emerges
in a privileged region of space (that is, in the vicinity of our present position),
and gradually expands to encompass the entire “favorable” spatial region
(being of finite size, as just a part of the finite universe). It is reasonable to
argue that in the infinite past such scenario happened at least once [by the
same token as the conclusions of Ellis and Brundrit (1979) apply with respect
to spatial infinity]. There are two possible follow-ups. Such supercivilization
could either exist for a definite, or for indefinite period of cosmic time. In
the first alternative, the universe we currently inhabit must be “recycled”,
as Davies warned; no mechanism for such a “de-technologization” is known
or even envisaged at present. Since we can envisage (if only very vaguely)
the methods through which advanced communities of intelligent beings may
technologize ever larger spatial volumes of the universe, and in the case of a
topologically closed universe, even the entire such universe (e.g. Tipler 1994),
a humble Humean approach suggests that we choose a “smaller miracle”—
that a supercivilization can exist for an indefinite time.
In any case, we may safely conclude that in the universes of finite size and
infinite age (as modelled by Ellis et al. and Phillips’ theories) the anthropic
argument necessarily leads us to paradoxes, if only we do not restrict the
growth of complexity, socio-technological advance of intelligent societies and
their technologization of the environment by definitional fiat. It goes without
saying that the situation is equally grave for the other model universes in
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which the universe is infinite in both spatial and temporal extension, but
in which the conditions favorable to life persist in either a finite or infinite
region for an infinite time. The main lesson of the anthropic spatial selection
such as our proximity to the boreal pole in Phillips’ model is that this form
of self-selection allows for most of the universe to be uninhabitable, and still
retain DT argument. This is valid even in the case in which the universe
is infinite and uninhabitable except for the finite region around our present
location.
As we can see in retrospect, the very fact of applying DT argument against
closed steady-state theories demonstrates that PCP is too strong a require-
ment for the operation of the argument. As Tipler (1982) stressed, only
stationarity and limited local properties are required. From a philosophical
point of view, it should be noted that it is also necessary that the rise of
intelligent communities and their expansion are possible within a given as-
trophysical environment. This is self-evident, since the humanity exists for a
finite time in a relatively stable environment, and expansion over interstellar
or even intergalactic lengthscales is, if not yet a reality, at least quite con-
ceivable from our point of view. The ultimate reason for this is our empirical
knowledge on the constancy of physical laws and their modes of operation
over these lengthscales. In a strongly inhomogeneous universe, or universe
with random fluctuations on the scales of, say, 1 pc, the argument looses its
power. However, according to the WAP selection, while free to ask questions
about possible physical origin of such a hypothetical bizarre behaviour, we
should not seek to confirm our conjectures by performing experiments and
observations in the real world, because such specific circumstance would pre-
clude our existence (Earman 1987). Therefore, it seems that in the cases
similar to the Ellis et al. and Phillips’ cosmologies, the DT argument can
not justifiably be regarded as contingent on anything stronger than WAP, as
Barrow and Tipler (1986) tend to do.
7 The Teleological SAP “Counterargument”
One of the possible recourses for a steady-state proponent in this quandary
concerns invoking the Strong Anthropic Principle (henceforth SAP) in its
teleological interpretation. It is necessary, therefore, to pause for a moment
and consider the meaning and possible interpretations of the SAP, since it
has been and still is a considerable source of confusion in the field of an-
thropic research. In the famous exposition of Carter (1974), several impor-
tant anthropic principles were defined. Among them, the most speculative
and thought-provoking has been exactly the SAP which states that:
...the Universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which
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it depends) must be such as to admit the creation of observers
within it at some stage.
Unfortunately, there is no such thing as the definition of SAP. Widely
used definition of Barrow and Tipler (1986) in their influential monograph,
has somewhat different overtones from the Carter’s original:
The Universe must have those properties which allow life to de-
velop within it at some stage in its history.
As noted and discussed in some detail by Earman (1987) and Bostrom
(2002), these definitions are not equivalent, and the one in Barrow and Tipler
certainly possesses (as, parenthetically, the entire monograph) strong teleo-
logical overtones. While one can plausibly argue that there is in fact nothing
particularly “strong” about SAP in the Carter’s formulation if it is regarded
as pointing to blanks for future physical explanation (Balashov 1990), the
somewhat heated discussion of this issue is outside of the scope of the present
study. Without entering into a general debate on the merits and shortcom-
ings of the teleological discourse in cosmology, it should be noted that it
arose as a natural reaction to the overuse of the Copernican principle in nat-
ural sciences, and particularly in cosmology. From this overuse follows, for
instance, uncritical (and often even unconscious) acceptance of cosmological
homogeneity, discussed in the section devoted to closed steady state mod-
els. From a prejudice that nothing in our position is special one may draw
bizarre conclusions, for example that it requires explanation that we are not
right now located in the intergalactic space, since the latter fills more than
99.99% of the volume of the universe, and any spatial location not in it is
truly exceptional on a grand scale. Understanding that we live in a priori
very improbable universe25 is an encouragement to teleological projects of
various kinds, of which not all must be unscientific (Barrow and Tipler 1986;
Tipler 1994). One of strategies for refuting the usage of the DT argument
lies exactly in assuming that the appearance of intelligent observers is not
only of low probability, but in the literal sense impossible. This has been ac-
knowledged, among others, by Ellis and Brundit (1979), who concluded that
“the existence of life on our own planet does not prove that this probability
is non-zero”. With that kind of approach, our existence is a miracle, which
has happened for some inexplicable, theological reason. This is an extreme
anti-Empedoclean attitude in the framework of which the biological (or at
least anthropological and psychological) evolution is completely transcendent
compared to the physical one. The ontological gap between the two seems
25One should, for instance, keep in mind the estimate of Penrose that a priori probability
of Big Bang happening in so smooth (low gravitational entropy) manner as to produce the
observable universe is only 1 part in 1010
123
!
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irreducible. This attitude is traditionally (although in a shallow, and some-
times openly incorrect, interpretation) linked to the major religious doctrines,
but it is interesting to note that the same sort of thinking is to be found in
writings of thinkers of opposite—or at least anticlerical—orientation, such as
Sir Fred Hoyle.
In his extraordinarily interesting and well-written autobiographical rem-
iniscences, Hoyle (1994) writes, in connection with his anthropic prediction
of the 12C level, but also, probably, alluding to some of the stranger conse-
quences of his own steady-state outlook:26
All of this suggested to me what I suppose might be called pro-
found questions. Was the existence of life a result of a set of
freakish coincidences in nuclear physics? Could it be that the
laws of physics are not the strictly invariant mathematical forms
we take them to be? Could there be variations in the forms, with
the Universe being a far more complex structure than we take
it to be in all our cosmological theories? If so, life would per-
force exist only where the nuclear adjustments happened to be
favorable, removing the need for arbitrary coincidences, just as
one finds in the modern formulation of the weak anthropic prin-
ciple. Or is the Universe teleological, with the laws deliberately
designed to permit the existence of life, the common religious
position? A further possibility, suggested by the modern strong
anthropic principle, did not occur to me in 1953 – namely, that
it is our existence that forces the nuclear details to be the way
they are, which is essentially the common religious position taken
backwards. Before ridiculing this last possibility, as quite a few
scientists tend to do, it is necessary, as I pointed out before, to
explain the condensation of the universal wave function through
the intervention of human consciousness.
Even more explicit is the discussion presented in his philosophically-
oriented review article written in 1982:
In Steady State Cosmology Revisited (University College Cardiff
Press, 1980) I estimated (on a very conservative basis) the chance
of random shuffling of amino acids producing a workable set of
enzymes to be less than 10−40000... Rather than accept a probabil-
ity less than 1 in 1040000 of life having arisen through the “blind”
forces of nature, it seems better to suppose that the origin of life
was a deliberate intellectual act. By “better” I mean less likely
to be wrong...
26A popular account of this problem and the Hoyle’s answer may also be found in Davies’
book on physical eschatology (Davies 1994).
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Suppose you were a superintellect working through possibil-
ities in polymer chemistry. Would you not be astonished that
polymers based on the carbon atom turned out in your calcula-
tions to have the remarkable properties of the enzymes and other
biomolecules? Would you not be bowled over in surprise to find
that a living cell was a feasible construct? Would you not say
to yourself, in whatever language supercalculating intellects use,
”Some supercalculating intellect must have designed the proper-
ties of the carbon atom, otherwise the chance of my finding such
an atom through the blind forces of nature would be less than 1
part in 1040000.” Of course you would, and if you were a sensible
superintellect you would conclude that the carbon atom is a fix.
In this manner, to the Adam’s dilemma (from The Paradise Lost), one
answers in affirmative: yes, the celestial bodies truly exist for the sake of the
Earth and human beings. Hutton would be happy with this solution! The
explanation of absence of extraterrestrial technology on large scales (that is,
both Fermi’s paradox in standard cosmology and DT problem in an eternal
universe) lies in the fact that the probability of the spontaneous conception
and subsequent evolution of any intelligent observers is exactly zero.27 The
very title of important article of Kardashev and Strelnitskij (1988), Superciv-
ilizations as possible products of the progressive evolution of matter is simply
wrong on this view, since there are underlying physical reason for impos-
sibility of transition between evolution of matter and that of life, and later
mind itself (presumably leading to the state of “supercivilization”). Before
we reject this as an obsolete and ridiculously dogmatic viewpoint, one should
note that this view is probably the only way known so far capable of prima
facie accounting for the often overlooked Wigner’s result that, within the
quantum mechanical formalism, the probability of spontaneous creation of
living systems is equal to zero (Wigner 1967, p. 200). Quantum mechanical
considerations also motivated Hoyle, in particular in his 1982 paper.
As pointed out by Tipler (2001, private communication), this picture is
difficult to defend along several lines. Major problem with this sort of ar-
gument is that it assumes that not merely intelligent life, but the specific
species Homo sapiens, is doing the selecting of the actual universe. There
27It seems that here one may find a fault in Hoyle’s reasoning. He estimates, on the
biochemical bass, that the probability of a spontaneous assembly of the first living cell is
smaller than 10−40000, and from this draws a conclusion that the universe must be much
older thanH−1
0
, as well as that a variation of the classical panspermia hypothesis must be a
correct explanation for the presence of life on Earth. However, the panspermia hypothesis
only increases the available 4-volume for random physical processes to bring about life;
this volume still remains finite. On the other hand, the universe of the classical steady-
state theory (as well as Hoyle’s later revised steady-state alternative) is truly infinite in
both space and time.
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is no positive reason for belief that humanity is ultimately privileged in this
way for participation in “creation” of the universe. On the contrary, as the
father of the very label “anthropic principle” Brandon Carter emphasized,
every form of intelligent life is in exactly the same situation. Of course, the
purpose of such Carter’s opinion is exactly to excise, together with anthro-
pocentrism, the teleological mode of explanation, and the answer we consider
in this section is manifestly teleological. However, it is not necessary to be
dogmatic either way in considering these issues. This danger may be avoided
on account of a general attitude (see, for instance, the discussion in Sklar
1985) that a metaphysical conjecture can be accepted as an explanatory hy-
pothesis, if capable of accounting for the existing empirical evidence, and in
particular in cases where the empirical evidence is slim.
Along these guidelines, one may speculate that more intelligent and more
advanced species would be better at “creating” universes than we could ever
hope to be (Harrison 1995). Even in the cases of manifestly teleological
schemes, such as the Omega-point theory of Tipler (1994), there is nothing
inherently advantageous in belonging specifically to Homo sapiens sapiens.
Our future descendants, the beings who will ultimately realize the purpose of
the universe in reaching the Omega point, can not with certainty be charac-
terized as closer to us than we are to birds and fishes. By openly recognizing
the issue of the melioristic universe in all its ramifications, Tipler (1994)
shows that teleology needs not necessarily to be burdened by dogmas of the
times past. The same lesson should, undoubtedly, apply to the teleological
mode of accounting for DT argument in universes with an infinite past series
of events.
Fortunately, we are not in the actual position to choose between these
alternatives, since our observable universe is certainly of finite age. How-
ever, this dilemma can resurface if we find that the larger whole in which
the observable universe is just an embedded part, possesses a structure char-
acterized by the past temporal infinity. We shall return to this point in §7.
For the moment, it should be noted that there is another possible recourse
for the steady-state picture, which Hoyle has used in the latest phase of his
cosmological thinking. This is the argument of the quasi- or revised steady-
state theory developed by him, Burbidge and Narlikar in a series of papers
published in 1990s (Hoyle 1992; Hoyle, Burbidge, and Narlikar 1993, 1994).
Here we basically have a novel strategy in the fight with entropy, and we now
investigate whether it is any more successful in dealing with DT argument.
8 Quasi-Stationarity and Intelligent Species
Although CSS theory is now universally considered defunct, there are some
recent developments to be considered in light of the preceding analysis. Open
of them is the emergence of the ”Quasi” steady-state theory (henceforth QSS)
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as an attempt to overcome the difficulties with observational evidence against
an unchangeable universe of PCP, and in favor of a hot state in the cosmic
past (Hoyle et al. 1993). The roots of this attempt can be found in Hoyle’s
early work (Hoyle 1949) in which, comparing the merits of his and Bondi-
Gold version of CSS, he writes:
Bondi and Gold... in discussing the continuous creation of mat-
ter, have avoided the introduction of a quantitative theory by
making the hypothesis that the universe, when taken on a suffi-
ciently large scale satisfies the wide (perfect) cosmological princi-
ple. Since the wide cosmological principle is very far from being
satisfied over regions with linear dimension less than about 1024
cm, such a hypothesis immediately raises the following questions:
What considerations determine the scale necessary for the wide
cosmological principle to be approximately satisfied?
Insofar as we can detect inhomogeneities in the universe in the form of
galaxies, clusters and other large-scale structure, we can set the spatial scale
for the application of the (restricted) cosmological principle. It is not ob-
vious which intervals similarly characterize smoothing of temporal fluctua-
tions. Of course, the relevant scale can be introduced by a definitional fiat,
thereby effectively introducing a new constant of nature, which is generally
unsatisfactory. Taking amplitudes of such fluctuations to be similar to the
conventional Hubble time directly led Hoyle (with fascinating consequence)
to the idea of mini-big bangs in the revised steady-state theory. Without
going into technical details (presented in Hoyle and Burbidge 1992; Hoyle et
al. 1993, 1994), it should be mentioned that, as well as in Hoyle’s version
of CSS model, negative energy of the creation field transforms into matter
with positive energy. However, the creation is not uniform in spacetime, but
occurs in discrete creation events, so-called “mini-bangs”. In each individual
“mini-bang” about 1016 Solar masses (a characteristic mass of superclusters
of galaxies) is created in the form of particles with Planck mass (MP l ∼ 10
−5
g). Each Planck particle ultimately produces about 5 × 1018 baryons which
react at high energies producing light chemical elements. The distribution of
creation events creates the characteristic cellular structure seen in the large
galaxy surveys of the last decade. The thermal energy of matter expanding
from the creation events is the ultimate origin of the all-pervading cosmic
microwave background; its anisotropy and local departure from the thermo-
dynamical equilibrium are lost through repeated interactions with specific
form of cosmic dust: elongated metallic whiskers (“needles”) created and
distributed through space by the supernovae explosions of the first genera-
tion of stars.
The revised steady state theory possesses a continuity with the earlier
work of Hoyle and Narlikar, mainly their results from 1966. study (Hoyle
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and Narlikar 1966), where the rejection of smooth continuous creation of the
previous theory has been emphasized in the very title of the paper (A radical
departure from the ’steady-state’ concept in cosmology). This model, in its
elaboration of 1990s, includes some of the elements of recent—particularly
observational astrophysical—developments, and so is more modern and closer
to the prevailing trends in science. At the same time, however, its structure
is complicated and possesses none of the beautiful simplicity of the classical
steady-state theory. Although detailed discriminatory observational tests of
the new model have not been performed yet, the probability that they will
give results expected by the QSS proponents is small indeed. Moreover, the
findings connected with the chemical abundances of the primordial matter,
as well as the deep galaxy fields, point to the lack of support for some of the
basic tenets of this model.
However, QSS does not stand much better against the anthropic argu-
ments. This theory is vulnerable to the DT argument in the same basic
manner as CSS cosmology. The fact that we shall encounter galaxies of sim-
ilar age to the Milky Way inside of the Local Supercluster represents only
a gigantic spatial and temporal translation of the problem, which does not
brings us closer to its solution. Galaxies and technological civilizations of
the appropriate age will be present in other superclusters, which could be
of an arbitrary age, obeying only the self-similar ”supercluster distribution
function” necessarily akin to Eq. (2). This strategy of “passing the buck”
is probably one of the chief reasons why DT argument has needed so much
time to be formulated. It may eventually solve our psychological difficulty
concerning past temporal infinity, but not the physical problem itself. If we
do not forbid information transport between the superclusters by definitional
fiat, the problem remains as acute as in the classical steady-state case.
9 Stationary Multiverse?
Recently the idea of stationarity on very large scales has been reanimated
in the form of several similar inflationary scenarios. A typical example is
the work of Andrei Linde and his collaborators (Linde 1988, 1990; Linde et
al. 1994), as well as Vilenkin (1992, 1995). In these models (known under
labels such as “chaotic” or “eternal” inflation), bubbles are formed out of
spacetime foam at Planck energy, each bubble evolving into an individual
universe in its own right, with specific topologies, geometries, laws of na-
ture, coupling constants, etc. The entire process of separation and inflation
of these individual bubble-universes has no beginning or end, and therefore
the entire ontological background of these processes (for which the appro-
priate name of multiverse is coined) is stationary. A significant similarity
between classical C-field cosmology and inflationary scenarios in general has
been noted recently (Hoyle 1992; Narlikar 1984). The manifestation of that
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swing of the pendulum backward from extreme evolutionism toward some
form of stationarity can be seen in the very titles of several recent papers,
such as From the Big Bang Theory to the Theory of Stationary Universe
(Linde et al. 1994). 28 It is still too early to estimate whether this should be
regarded as the general tendency to recover some of the advantages of ”sta-
tionary” cosmologies (and, possibly, a counter-reaction to the overemphasis
on ”evolutionary uncertainties” frequently employed in astrophysics as an ad
hoc, or rather ignoramus, recipe). Future historians of science will have to
discuss this question.
The role of “local inhomogeneities” which is played by galaxies in the
classical steady-state model, is played by entire individual bubble-universes
in the multiverse theories. As suggested by Linde (1990), different ways
of breaking of the initial complete symmetry of the single “unified” force
of nature will occur in different bubble-universes, and so a wild variety of
physical conditions are likely to arise. It is natural to ask, therefore, whether
the DT anthropic argument applies to those quantum cosmological models
which are in a global stationary state. It should be immediately clear that the
inflationary scenarios have great relevance for the entire problem of existence
of life in the universe. As an illustration, in a conclusion to their highly
technical paper on some aspects of inflation, Novello and Heintzmann (1984)
write:
Two possibilities arise to have a sufficiently old universe: either
S0 [the present-day scale factor of our universe] is large—which
means that the Universe was never very dense and thereby never
very hot (this would guarantee biological conditions for all of
the cosmic epoch); or 1/H0 is very large and S0 small. In this
case biological reactions will only occur (or reoccur) in the late
expanding phase and existence of life would only occur at a finite
time; whereas in the first case, life could have existed eternally in
the universe, leading to the intriguing hypothesis that there may
be colonies in space which are infinitely more intelligent than we
are.
There are several methods to escape the conclusions of the DT argument
in the multiverse case. The simplest one is to reject the very notion of “eter-
nal” inflation. This possibility (differently motivated) has been investigated
by Vilenkin (1995) and Borde and Vilenkin (1994). The goal of these stud-
ies is to show that, under a general range of physical conditions, the initial
singular beginning is compulsory, from which it immediately stems that the
entire multiverse is of finite age. The outcome is not unambiguous. Another
28This phenomenon in its historical context could be compared to the similar return of
(neo) catastrophism on the scene in geology and paleontology (e.g. Clube 1995).
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possible approach is the one discussed by Barrow and Tipler in Chapter
IX of their monograph: to forbid information transport between individ-
ual bubble-universe by physical reasons. The “environment” surrounding
the bubble-universes is false vacuum at energies close to the Planck energy,
which makes any communication hard to imagine, to say the least (but see
Garriga et al. 1999). This conclusion may be challenged on the grounds that
(i) what is hard to imagine today, does not need to be so for the advanced
civilizations which have already technologized a large part or their entire
domicile bubble-universe and thus marshaled unbelievable material and in-
tellectual resources, and (ii) it may well be possible to communicate between
two bubble-universes in a non-classical way, that is using (or creating!) the
complex topological structure of the multiverse. The latter method would
rely on some version of the well-known concept of “wormholes” (e.g. Morris,
Thorne and Yurtsever 1988; Visser 1990). Finally, the third possible strat-
egy lies in possibility that individual bubble-universes (with finite resources,
and therefore the finite duration of an active technologized state) may be
separated from the Planck spacetime foam at a rate sufficiently high enough
to achieve a state equilibrium with the formation and evolution of generic
intelligent communities. Such an equilibrium will reflect the state in which
most of “young” universes are uninhabited either by their native superciv-
ilizations or by an external (“colonizing”) supercivilization of an arbitrary
age. However, it goes without saying that this is extremely speculative, and
therefore is mentioned here just for the sake of completness. Otherwise, one
cannot escape an agreement with the judgement of Barrow and Tipler that
this... objection is much weaker in the inflation steady-state uni-
verse situation than it is in the standard steady-state universe
model, for it is far from clear that it is possible to develop tech-
nology which will allow intelligent life to exist... in the steady
state region.
10 Lessons and morals
From the mind-boggling reaches of the multiverse inflationary theories, let
us return to the classical cosmology and try to summarize our conclusions so
far. Several classical cosmological models have been compared in Table 1 with
respect to some properties relevant for the anthropic reasoning and survival
of intelligent observers. These properties refer to both dynamics, topology
and application of the DT argument. Taken together, they illustrate the
range (certainly not exhaustive) of classical cosmological thought and the
close connection of the entire anthropic reasoning to other physically defined
properties of particular models. All models presented in Table 1 possess a
past temporal infinity in at least one sense (i.e. according to one of the major
37
theories of the ontological status of time discussed above). Some of them are
static at large scales, and most are not; the ambiguous sign for the case of
classical de Sitter universe stands for the curious historical ambiguity on the
meaning of “static”.29 Some models are topologically closed, while others are
flat or open, and some possess such specific features as (global) singularities
and horizons.30
No. Model Static Closed Matter Singular Horizon D-T
1. Einstein + + + - - +
2. de Sitter + - - - - + -
3. Eddington-
Lemaˆıtre
- - + - + - +
4. Classical
SS
- - + - + +
5. Ellis et al. + + + + - +
6. Phillips - + + + - +
7. Oscillatory
nonsingular
- + + - - + -
8. Revised SS - - + - + +
Table 1: Comparison of some classical cosmological models on several counts
related to the anthropic argument against past temporal infinities.
In the last column of Table 1, the applicability of the DT argument, ac-
cording to our study, is presented. In the case of the Eddington-Lemaˆıtre
model, the outcome strongly depends on the detailed physical properties of
the initial equilibrium state. In most versions of this model, the anthropic
argument is clearly inapplicable, although the strong version of the argu-
ment may be operational in some specific versions. The dependence on the
physical detail also plays a crucial role in considerations of non-singular cycli-
cal models (singular models can not be justifiably called oscillatory at all).
Here the real issue is information transport between the successive phases
of contraction and expansion. If the physical conditions are too extreme at
the point of the smallest radius, the information on the previous cycle will
be erased, and the subsequent phase will essentially be a completely new
universe, “from scratch”. These conditions, in turn, depend on the exact
29Metric coefficients do not change with time in this model, and for that reason it was
conceived and received as static, at least in the first decades after 1917; according to the
modern view, it is an exponentially expanding model.
30It is important to emphasize that the singularities under considerations are the global
ones; otherwise, all spacetimes in which at least some worldlines are incomplete should
qualify as singular, including the classical steady state theory which is characterized by
creation “micro-singularities” (and does not manifestly prevent formation of black hole
singularities!).
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values of cosmological parameters in the model,31 as well as in unknown
physics on which the concept of a bounce critically depends. In addition,
the duration of expanding and contracting phase must be long enough for
the advanced technological communities to arise (WAP constraint), or—in
the stronger version—for the process of spontaneous creation of probes (and
probes causally connected with the region beyond the bounce at that!) to
occur. Since various combinations of parameters are possible in this class
of models, it is not possible to give a generic answer on the applicability
question.
A criticism usually encountered from people for the first time facing such
an anthropic argument concerns the relationship of laws and instances in cos-
mology. How can such an argument based on a single instance of intelligent
and technological life be used as a general argument against a wide spectrum
of specific physical cosmologies, such as the classical steady-state theory cer-
tainly is. There are two possible answers to this basic non sequitur. First of
all, there is no generic form of cosmological model; as shown clearly by Bal-
ashov (1994) in the detailed analysis of CSS theory, the entire theory can be
both legitimately and practically derived from an essentially methodological
principle as is PCP. Mutatis mutandis, the rejection of such a theory can be
both legitimately and practically done on the account of argument pointing
out the self-contradictory nature of particular instances of PCP application.
Let us reiterate: there is no inherent need for life to exist in the universe satis-
fying the Perfect Cosmological Principle. In a sense, it would be much easier
to formulate PCP for the counterfactual case of lifeless universe, since ampli-
tudes of “local inhomogeneities“ could as well be either much smaller or much
larger from the narrow range required for satisfying the WAP constraints. For
instance, the counterfactual universe with amplitude of fluctuations several
orders of magnitude smaller than those detected in the real universe through
cosmic microwave background observations could evolve as mildly inhomo-
geneous plasma according to PCP without ever forming galaxies and stars.
New matter will simply keep the density of such plasma constant. Very high
(again counterfactual) value of the Hubble constant will probably have the
same effect. However, once we make an observation of existence of life (and
intelligence), PCP requires that we have the same in all ages and in infinitely
many places.
The second aspect of the dilemma is contained in the ambiguous status
of the biological and psychological evolution in our picture of the universe.
It seems clear that we are dealing with a double standard here. When Fred
Hoyle predicted the existence of 7.65 MeV metastable level in the nucleus of
31And if these parameters are allowed to vary between the cycles in a random manner,
there is no reason to believe in an infinite number of cycles at all: the cosmological constant,
which is one of these parameters, could change the sign and become strongly positive,
which would lead to an ever-expanding (although topologically still closed!) universe.
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12C on the basis of existence of carbon and carbon-based life (Hoyle et al.
1953; Hoyle 1994), it was quite clear that this level does not exist separately
from the entire scope of physical sciences. On the contrary, it was clear from
the beginning that the energy and all relevant properties of this level can
in principle be reduced to the particular numerical values of the constants
of nature, like the Planck constant and elementary charge. Therefore, fine
tuning of the 12C level is actually only a manifestation of the fine tuning
of various constants of nature. Conceptually, this manifestation is redun-
dant. However, we can not, as discussed in Barrow and Tipler (1986), back
track and reconstruct the manner in which the particular values of constants
propagate toward creating the observed energy of this level. This is just
a technical matter, because the carbon nucleus is an extremely complicated
quantum system, and there is simply not enough sophistication and calculat-
ing power in the present-day nuclear physics to perform such back tracking.
Still, it is important to note that nobody denies principal possibility of such
reconstruction, which can be achieved in a matter of decades if the devel-
opment of numerical science and computers continues at the present pace.
The same idea applies, mutatis mutandis, to other examples of so frequently
discussed “anthropic coincidences”.
However, a significant resistance is encountered when the same reason-
ing applies to systems which are more complex than nuclei—say living and
intelligent beings. Still, there is no evidence whatsoever that living systems
are in any way different from usual physical systems except in the level of
complexity (Davies 1999). Views sometimes expressed to the contrary can
be regarded only as remnants of the obsolete vitalistic doctrines. Indications
that the mental processes occurring in intelligent beings can be in principle
ultimately reduced in a manner essentially the same as is conjecture for the
carbon nucleus have been gathered by Tipler (1994) and Stapp (1985). Simi-
lar thoughts have been expressed earlier in XX century by Erwin Schro¨dinger
in his influential What is Life? essays (Schro¨dinger 1944).
It is clear that the weak version of DT argument may be criticized on
historico-sociological arguments. Let us assume that there is an absolute
maximum for the development of any community of intelligent beings, and
that the contact cross section of this maximum is small. In that case, if the
rate of emergence of intelligent communities is sufficiently low in comparison
to the Hubble expansion rate, in the finite relaxation time it is possible to
achieve the equilibrium in which arbitrarily large fraction of the comoving
3-volume is non-technologized. This could be called the Spenglerian model of
intelligent communities (e.g. Fischer 1989). For an exception to the prevail-
ing paradigm of discontinuity between the contemporary worldview in the
natural sciences and history understood in Spenglerian terms, one may look
at the excellent recent study of Victor Clube devoted to cometary neocatas-
trophism in planetary studies (Clube 1995). This work, under the instructive
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title The Nature of Punctual Crises and the Spenglerian Model of Civiliza-
tion presents—in a different, still quite relevant scientific framework—how
much the self-contentedness and dogmatical blindness in science in the last
century or two could lead toward a de facto wrong factual road. It was
first the medieval immutable heavens, and subsequently uniformitarian (an-
ticlerical, ironically enough) dogma on exclusiveness of slow evolutionary
change, which impeded—and to a degree still impedes—acceptance of the
truth about the significance of catastrophic events originating in our cosmic
environment. The specific problem with the Spenglerian model lies exactly
in the mentioned need for non-exclusivity: as the teleological counter-
argument becomes valid only if the probability of spontaneous creation of
life (and/or von Neumann probes) is for some reason exactly equal to zero,
and not only very small, so here the number of civilizations which are ca-
pable of escaping the Spenglerian “curse” must be exactly zero in order for
the explanation to work in an infinitely old universe. This is even harder to
imagine than the previous case, because if the proponents of impossibility
of spontaneous creation of life can enlist quantum mechanics on their side,
the proponents of the Spenglerian model have to show that sociology and
history are in a sense more universal than quantum mechanics itself! (Of
course, the Spenglerian model remains a strong palliative to naive concepts
of universe blossoming with life in case of temporally and spatially limited
systems; therefore, it remains very relevant for the Fermi’s paradox and the
SETI problem in the Milky Way.) Of course, the stronger Tipler’s version of
the anthropic argument, related to spontaneously assembled von Neumann
probes is entirely immune to this type of criticism.
The core lesson of the entire case for the anthropic argument against cos-
mologies containing past temporal infinities is, however, located on a deep
epistemological level. As a side effect of both the Copernican revolution and
the Cartesian dualism, the implicit rejection of the pre-Socratic picture of the
inseparability of the cosmological, biological and anthropological domains led
to an inevitable delay in noticing a powerful and specific cosmological argu-
ment. Further discussions on this topic, as well as further discussions of the
future of physical universe, will have to explicitly take into account the
existence and activities of intelligent observers. This will manifest itself not
only in retrodictions about the cosmological past, as the original anthropic
argument of Dicke and Carter has been traditionally used, but also through
the predictive aspect of cosmology. These considerations will necessarily be
of a multidisciplinary character, so desirable in this latest epoch of develop-
ment of our picture of the universe.
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